Unity: Support From Cognitive Science
[Photo by Melisande]
Stanovich (2004a) agrees with two central points of Henriques' argument (start here). Firstly that human cognitive architecture can be split into 'two broad domains': quick-acting, unconscious parallel processes and logical-analytic processing, which is linear, slower and conscious. Secondly, Stanovich (2004a) agrees that the differences between humans and other animals are central to psychology.Taking the 'two broad domains' first, these are seen in cognitive psychology in a number of dual-process theories that have been developed: Stanovich (2004b) identifies 22 of them. How have these dual-processes arisen? Some evolutionary psychologists argue that hypothetical thinking was selected for as it allowed humans to understand other minds. Hypothetical thinking allows a person to imagine 'possible states of the world'.
Hypothetical thinking is also central, in Stanovich's view to the difference between humans and animals rather than Henriques' justification processes. Metarepresentational abilities, or 'thinking about thinking', represent the 'cognitive divide' between humans and animals. This is where Stanovich (2004a) takes issue with Henriques although he does agree that justification processes could have been involved in the development of metarepresentational abilities.
Stanovich (2004a) Metarepresentation and the great cognitive divide: a commentary on Henriques' "psychology defined" (Abstract)Stanovich (2004b) The Robot's Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin (Amazon)Labels: Unity Series
Like this post?
Get new articles free in your email inbox (max: 3 per week): 
Subscribe to PsyBlog's RSS Feed
Bookmark this post on Del.icio.us
Stumble It!
5 comments
good source www.psychoworld.sk
The dual process stuff is fascinating. Have you had a look at the conference held in Cambridge, UK, this year, In Two Minds? Some draft papers and slides are up there, prepared by philosophers, psychologists, and functional imagers.
I just ran across your blog. Very interesting discussion of unity.
One of the interesting facets of these discussions is that they bring so many questions of a fundamental nature to the fore. The capacity for hypothetical thinking as a distinct line of demarcation separating homo sapiens from other animals has long seemed to me to represent the heart of human psychology.
To have a theory of mind - an awareness of alternates and a capacity to create novel mental alternates - is not only central to conscious executive functions such as planning behavior and anticipation of consequences; I believe that hypothetical capacities are also pivotal to our capacity for empathy, for play and for symbolic representation in daydreams, nocturnal dreams, art and in the very capacity for representational language itself. Likewise, one could argue that it is the capacity for hypothetical thinking that underlies what Freud described as compromise formation, as well as object relations theory and, more recently, intersubjective self-psychology ala Robert Stolorow.
It also seems to me that our hypothetical capacity weaves seamlessly between the two tracks of human cognition – one being the more conscious, linear, intentional and rational track – the other being the track of unconscious, associative, parallel processes. In a sense, we are animal (or biologic machine?) that exists in relationship to something akin to a ‘non-machine being’ that is constantly engaged in constructive and deconstructive processes within both tracks of mental activity. Information between these two tracks seems to be exchanged with a purpose that has been conceptualized in a number of different ways. Regardless of the conceptualization, the exchange between levels takes place without conscious awareness, but with fascinating results. It is only the suggestive manifestations of this exchange between tracks that can be observed. Think of parapraxes, for example.
As many of us believe, the fact that there are neural processes underlying behavior and learning that operates in a more machine-like manner consistent with a behavioral conceptualization of human functioning, does not rule out the existence of processes that fall outside the bounds of what a behavioral approach can reckon with. The methods of behaviorism exclude consideration of anything other than these machine-like, quantifiable processes. This self-imposed limitation is far from an acceptable reason for assuming that these are the only processes at work in human beings.
The tension between these two tracks of human psychic life, do indeed, remind me very much of the yet to be reconciled tensions between quantum physics and 'Newtonian' laws of the material world.
Good work! I'll definitely be back to visit your site.
Clinical Psychologist
Chicago
Thanks for your thoughtful comment Dr Fortunato. I don't think I can argue with any of the things you say there. I'm happy you see parallels and links between your understanding and the unity discussion.
It seems to me that psychology is ripe for the identification of these kind of parallels. The more psychologists can build consensus, the better off we'll all be: as students, teachers and practitioners.
Thanks for that pointer Andy, very useful. I see from that page that Keith Stanovich is now advocating a tri-process [PDF] theory. Those theoretical wheels never stop turning!