At the outset of this journey into the emotions, I considered the philosophical work of Robert Solomon. Recall that Solomon argues that emotions are judgements and strategies rather than experiences that well up unbidden from the deep. This post asks whether it is possible to find any empirical evidence for this attractive idea.
Continue reading “Neural Correlates of Emotional Judgements”
Blurry and confusing definitions are the stock-in-trade of psychologists, just as they are of many other scientists. Perhaps you have noticed that I have been guilty of using the words ‘affect’ and ’emotion’ rather loosely. I’m not the only one. Similar to many other areas of psychology, emotion researchers are far from decided and united on where to draw the lines, and, indeed, if lines can or should be drawn at all.
Continue reading “Blurred Definitions of Affect and Emotion”
One of the main points I took away from the discussion on unity is that psychology needs to integrate results from different methodologies in order to better understand psychological phenomena. The emotions are a prime example of where this is happening, perhaps because the late blooming of emotion research has coincided with the explosion of brain imaging paradigms. And so the term ‘affective neuroscience’ has come into it’s own. This post asks whether there’s any justification for separating affective neuroscience from cognitive neuroscience.
The term ‘affective neuroscience’ was coined by Jaak Panksepp in the early 1990s to distinguish it from cognitive neuroscience. Panksepp explains his view that affect or feelings are:
“…distinct neurobiological processes in terms of anatomical, neurochemical, and various functional criteria, including peripheral bodily interactions. Emotional and motivational feelings are unique experientially valenced ‘state spaces’ that help organisms make cognitive choices – e.g., to find food when hungry, water when thirsty, warmth when cold, and companionship when lonely or lusty.” (Panksepp, 2003:6)
Panksepp departs from LeDoux who, you’ll recall (if not go here), thinks conscious emotions are too bound up in the problem of consciousness to be currently amenable to sensible investigations. Panksepp, meanwhile, argues that ‘affect’, by definition consciously experienced emotion, is important in the study of emotions.
That aside, one of the most important points that Panksepp (2003) addresses is the question of whether affects and cognitions can be separated in any meaningful way. He argues that while it may not be possible untangle cognitions from affect, there is considerable utility in examining the way in which it is ’embodied’. And here lies an important role for the neuroimaging of humans and animal brain research.
So what evidence is there, for Panksepp (2003), that emotions and cognitions can be separated?
Even taken together these points do not prove that affects and cognitions are separate entities, but they do suggest some separation between processes. From the opposite perspective, it is clear that affects and cognitions, while their distinctiveness is being argued here, are massively and necessarily interrelated. Thinking evolutionarily, our cognitions need our emotions and vica versa. A head is no use without a heart to go with it. That doesn’t mean there isn’t considerable utility in analysing each separately.
In the reality of everyday research, Panksepp (2003) argues, it is useful to emphasise the distinction between affects and cognitions if only to encourage a greater focus on emotion.
Panksepp, J. (2003). At the interface of the affective, behavioral, and cognitive neurosciences: Decoding the emotional feelings of the brain. Brain and Cognition, 52(1), 4-14. (Abstract)
Kent Berridge at the University of Michigan has carried out some interesting research into the emotional unconscious.
Having introduced the idea of the emotional unconscious in the last post, I am going to dive straight into some of the research which attempts to prove its existence. Kent Berridge at the University of Michigan has carried out some interesting research into the emotional unconscious. But despite some good evidence, Berridge & Winkielman (2003) make the point that the existence of unconscious emotions is still controversial.
This is made clear by the caution with which Berridge Winkielman (2003) discuss the idea when introducing their own studies. Like LeDoux (1996), Berridge & Winkielman (2003) point to the way in which emotion has often been defined as requiring a conscious component.
In the first study Berridge & Winkielman (2003) report, Winkielman, Berridge & Wilbarger (2000) exposed participants to subliminal emotional cues in facial expressions while they thought they were engaged in a study about gender. They then allowed their participants to ‘interact’ with a fruit-flavoured drink.
The results showed that those who were thirsty and exposed to happy faces drank 50% more of the drink than neutrally primed participants. The mirror effect was seen for the negative-primed participants. Importantly, participants were not aware of the priming and were not aware of being in a better or worse mood depending on their priming condition. Further, the priming conditions had no effect on participants who weren’t thirsty.
A similar paradigm was used in Winkielman et al.’s (2000) second study. Here, though, instead of focussing on the amount of drink, participants evaluated the drink. Again, the subliminal priming had the same effect on subjective ratings of the drink. But, this time participants completed a 20-item PANAS scale before and after the subliminal priming and no differences were found.
These two studies certainly look like they provide useful evidence for the emotional unconscious, but Berridge & Winkielman (2003) consider an alternative explanation. Perhaps the unconscious information participants were primed with was purely cognitive. This would explain why participants did not report any affective changes – there hadn’t been any. Berridge & Winkielman (2003) argue, however, that this interpretation is not consistent with other evidence. This research suggests that facial expressions do indeed induce an affective response as shown on behavioural or physiological measures, e.g. activation of the amygdala.
But, if this line of argument isn’t convincing, then Berridge & Winkielman (2003) argue that a particular order manipulation in their study provides further evidence of an affective rather than cognitive process. Some participants, after subliminal priming focussed their attention on themselves, while other participants focussed on the drink. If the priming was cognitive, in the form of a ‘free-floating belief’, there should have been a difference between these two conditions. This effect was not seen, suggesting the process was affective.
Winkielman et al.’s (2000) studies certainly provide some useful preliminary evidence to support the idea of the emotional unconscious.
Berridge, K., Winkielman, P. (2003). What is an unconscious emotion? (The case for unconscious “liking”). Cognition Emotion, 17(2), 181-211. (Abstract)
LeDoux, J. (1996). The emotional brain: the mysterious underpinnings of emotional life. London: Simon Schuster.
Winkielman, P., Berridge, K., Wilbarger, J. (2000). Unconscious affect for doing without feeling: Subliminal facial expressions alter human consumption. Unpublished manuscript
LeDoux (1996) examines and explains the automatic nature of many emotional processes.
In the last post I started the discussion of emotions with a few general points made by the philosopher Robert Solomon. In this post I’m moving onto a psychologist whose study of the emotions has been extremely influential: Joseph LeDoux. In his book, The Emotional Brain, LeDoux (1996) examines and explains the automatic nature of many emotional processes. But these won’t concern us just yet. First we need to consider an important criticism LeDoux makes of much previous research into emotions.
Many people would say their emotions only come when they will and not when they want.
“A thought comes when it will, not when I will.” – Nietzsche, quoted in Solomon (2003).
Nietzsche’s quote raises an important question about both thoughts and, implicitly, about emotions. Many people would say their emotions only come when they will and not when they want. So how do thoughts and emotions interact in everyday life and in therapeutic processes like cognitive behavioural therapy? Do we really have any control over our emotions or are they things that just happen to us?
Many people would say their emotions only come when they will and not when they want.
“A thought comes when it will, not when I will.” – Nietzsche, quoted in Solomon (2003).
Nietzsche’s quote raises an important question about both thoughts and, implicitly, about emotions. Many people would say their emotions only come when they will and not when they want. So how do thoughts and emotions interact in everyday life and in therapeutic processes like cognitive behavioural therapy? Do we really have any control over our emotions or are they things that just happen to us? This is a series of posts examining these and related ideas.
Continue reading “Journey Through the Psychology of Emotions”
We all rely on experts to make correct and consistent decisions: from medical professionals to fingerprint experts. We’d like to think these decisions are unaffected by their often highly charged emotional contexts, but is that really the case?
On the 11 March 2004 thirteen bombs were loaded onto commuter trains at Alcala de Henares station, 40km outside Madrid. Not long after, ten of them exploded killing 191 people and wounding more than 1,700. Using a fingerprint found on a plastic bag filled with detonators, the FBI, with automated computer matching and experienced experts, obtained and confirmed a positive identification with a US citizen, Brandon Mayfield. Mayfield, a recent convert to Islam, appeared to fit the bill perfectly and he was immediately arrested and imprisoned.
The beauty of a novel is it can transport you inside someone else’s mind. Even the dreariest hack has to be on nodding terms with human psychology in order to pump out a half-decent airport novel. Few novelists, though, worship at psychology’s altar with the vehemence of J. G. Ballard. And few others can, in my view, match Ballard for his uniquely exhilarating and often equally disturbing results. Frequently referred to as the ‘Seer of Shepperton’ Ballard is a keen observer of all that makes us human, using his novels almost as laboratories in which he can pose questions about humanity.
The BPS Research Digest recently drew my attention to a study published in Personality and Individual Differences, which has relevance for all types of psychological research. It asks a fundamental question: what types of people participate in research?
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