The BPS Research Digest recently drew my attention to a study published in Personality and Individual Differences, which has relevance for all types of psychological research. It asks a fundamental question: what types of people participate in research?
As promised the unity debate continues (start here) with a look at the whole second issue in the Journal of Clinical Psychology. Rather than summarising the articles – you can read the abstracts yourself – I’ve given each one a (very) short and personal review which will hopefully point the generalist in the right direction for further reading.
Here’s a subject close to my heart: cycling. Not least because I’m a keen cyclist myself but also because cycling is good in so many different ways – but I’m not going to bang on about that now. This study, however, has some counter-intuitive findings (the best kind!) about helmet wearing that seems to suggest cars pass closer if you’ve got a lid on. Also, and in stark contrast to conventional wisdom among experienced cyclists, riding further away from the curb does not cause road users to leave more space when over-taking.
Continue reading “Vehicles Pass Closer to Helmeted Cyclists”
For those of you finding the discussion on unity in psychology a little dry (surely not!?!), I have good news: this is the penultimate post in the series. In the next I will foolishly attempt to summarise and comment on all of the articles in the second special issue of the Journal of Clinical Psychology. This is not, of course, the end of the discussion, just the beginning, but simply touching on this subject has opened my eyes to a wealth of debates within psychology. I want to reflect on this briefly.
Stanovich (2004a) agrees with two central points of Henriques’ argument (start here). Firstly that human cognitive architecture can be split into ‘two broad domains’: quick-acting, unconscious parallel processes and logical-analytic processing, which is linear, slower and conscious. Secondly, Stanovich (2004a) agrees that the differences between humans and other animals are central to psychology.
The harshest criticism I’ve yet read of Henriques’ bid to unify psychology (starting here) comes from Stephen Yanchar. He sees Henriques’ work as an attempt to repackage extant theoretical perspectives and sidestep critical reflection.
Yanchar (2004) draws attention to the literature that cautions against unification. Indeed, the idea of unity would ‘force psychology into a theoretical straightjacket’. Henriques’ model is described as: ‘rigid’, ‘exclusive’ and ‘disciplinary agenda setting’. More important than unification, for Yanchar (2004:1280) is: “…a continual dialogue among psychologists from diverse research communities,” and, “…the pursuit of truth…”
Recently, in the search for unity in psychology (starting here) we’ve hit quite a lot of naysayers: psychology is already unified, it doesn’t need unification, it’s impossible, it’s pointless, it’s missing the point. Today, before I completely give up hope, the case for the defence (or is it prosecution?). In either case, a few hardy souls are happy to stand up and say, yes, things could be different, and perhaps it could even be better. Good for them.
A philosophical response to Henriques comes from Jack Presbury who wants to give the Tree of Knowledge a good shake. This article is superficially attractive not least because he states:
“The Big Bang and the dinosaurs may have been here long before we humans were, but if we hadn’t come along, they might as well have not existed, because nobody would know about it. The basic epistemological issue is that nothing could be known if we humans did not have the capacity to know. Everything is psychology. It is psychology – not physics – that is the mother of all sciences.”
What could be a more appealing statement to a psychologist? It’s the physicists who should have psychology envy!
Continue reading “Unity: Psychology is the Mother of All Sciences”
More criticism of attempts to unify psychology which, as you will see, don’t much impress me. Lilienfeld (2004) responds to Henriques’ article by asking whether attempting to define psychology is worth the trouble. Lilienfeld (2004) argues that there is little utility in defining psychology more precisely – after all biologists (apparently) have some difficulty in defining what life is. The word ‘psychology’ is inherently ‘fuzzy’ and unity would simply encourage ‘turf-wars’ between psychology and sociology, ethology and so on.
When I started my first psychology course I couldn’t understand the separation between the different subjects, or disciplines, in psychology. Developmental psychologists aren’t that much different from cognitive psychologists – they both study mental events and processes – but one almost never refers to the other. Why?
Continue reading “Unity in Psychology: The Search Starts Here”
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