Misrepresenting Science: The Observer's Autism Scare Story

A couple of weeks ago The Observer (UK 'quality' Sunday paper) printed an article claiming an as yet unpublished study shows a dramatic rise in the prevalence of autism. They also managed to crowbar in the MMR vaccine as well just to raise the general levels of hysteria.

I ignored the story, just assuming it was the usual rubbish. Another case of misinterpretation, misrepresentation or just plain incorrect reporting that science stories often receive.

While I'm naturally distrustful of these kind of stories, it is exactly the kind of thing that easily enters people's consciousness. From only causing a small shift in people's understanding to influencing them to refuse their children have the MMR vaccine, it's all dangerous misinformation.

Practically, though, as the study is unpublished, it is difficult to rebut. Difficult but not impossible.

Luckily for us BadScience's Ben Goldacre is on the case. If you're new to the story the best place to start is with Goldacre's column in The Guardian where he gives the full details and dismantles the story.

Then when you're up to speed, check out the update entitled "The Observer still misses the point, and makes a hash of apologising...". The post finishes with this quote:
"I am pretty jaded and sceptical, but this front page story has completely stunned and astonished me. The misrepresentations and errors went way beyond simply misunderstanding the science, and after digging right to the bottom of it all, knowing what I know now, I have never resorted to hyperbole before, but I can honestly say: this episode has changed the way I read newspapers."

Well said.

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Emotion Processing in Autism Spectrum Disorders

Autism
[Photo by crowolf]
Like alexithymia, those with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are also known to have problems processing emotional information. This may at least partially account for some core features of autistic behaviour: especially problems in social interactions. After all, ordinary social interactions contain considerable emotional components. This post looks at studies which have examined how those with ASDs may have deficits in the automatic processing of emotions.

Hill and Frith (2003) describe three main cognitive theories of autism. Of these the one that has the clearest parallels with emotional processing theories is Baron-Cohen's 'mindblindness' hypothesis. In this theory, those with ASDs are thought to have problems intuitively understanding the minds of others. But, this does not mean that individuals with autism cannot understand the mental states of others - it's just that they have to explicitly work it out rather than the knowledge being processed implicitly.

Hill, Berthoz and Frith (2004) found problems in the cognitive processing of emotions in individuals with ASDs. They were also seen to have higher levels of depression than both a control group and a group of relations of the individuals with ASDs.

So this give us some general evidence of emotion processing problems in ASDs, but what about the dual process model of appraisal? Some exciting new evidence comes from McIntosh, Reichmann-Decker, Winkielman and Wilbargeret (2006) who examined the way adults and adolescents with ASDs mimic facial expressions.


Copying facial expressions

The mimicking of other people's facial expression is something that we all do naturally. It oils the wheels of social interaction. We perceive the facial expression of others, then quickly and effortlessly flex corresponding muscles in our own faces to reflect the feeling back. McIntosh et al. (2006) contrast this type of automatic mimicry with the slow effortful mimicry we carry out when consciously trying to copy another's expression.

McIntosh et al. (2006) compared the automatic responses of a control group with individuals with ASDs by using facial EMG to measure movement of the major cheek and brow muscles. There were two phases to the experiment, in the first participants simply watched a screen on which were displayed different pictures of happy and sad faces. In the second, participants were asked to copy the expression they saw in the picture.

The results showed that individuals with ASDs did not automatically mimic facial expressions they saw in the pictures, as did the control group. On the other hand, they had no problem imitating facial expression explicitly, indeed they were better at imitation than the control group. McIntosh et al. (2006) argue that this fact rules out alternative explanations of their results which include the individuals with ASDs having problems in perceiving the faces, praxis, or understanding the task they were carrying out.


Mimicry in the brain scanner

From a study carried out by Dapretto, Davies, Pfeifer, et al. (2006) we even have information about the neurological basis for these behavioural findings. In this study participants carried out a task similar to that used by McIntosh et al. (2006) but this time inside an fMRI scanner.

The major difference found in brain activation between the groups was that the individuals with ASDs showed no activation in the so-called 'mirror neuron system'. The mirror neuron system is hypothesised to be involved in understanding the thoughts and actions of others, along with many other functions! If you're new to mirror neurons then start with Mixing Memory's posts here, and here.

Again, individuals with ASDs showed no difference to the control group in imitating faces, and no differences were seen by eye tracking equipment. In other words, both groups were looking at the photos in a similar way. Those with ASDs did, however, show differences in brain activation when they attempted to imitate the face in the photo.

Dapretto et al. (2006) speculate that those with ASDs have deficits in automatic processing through the mirror neuron system, for which other parts of their brains compensate when imitating facial expressions.


ASDs and alexithymia

Both of these imitation studies provide some evidence that individuals with ASDs suffer deficits in their automatic processing of emotions, but are quite capable of imitating emotions consciously. This provides a clear parallel with the studies carried out on people with alexithymia, who also have problems with the automatic unconscious processing of emotions but can clearly describe emotions that are in focal awareness.


References

Dapretto, M., Davies, M., Pfeifer, J., et al. (2006). Understanding emotions in others: mirror neuron dysfunction in children with autism spectrum disorders. Nature Neuroscience, 9(1), 28-30.

Gillberg, C., & Rastam, M. (1992). Do some cases of anorexia nervosa reflect underlying autistic conditions? Behavioural Neurology, 5, 27-32.

Hill, E., Berthoz, S., & Frith, U. (2004). Brief Report: Cognitive Processing of Own Emotions in Individuals with Autistic Spectrum Disorder and in Their Relatives. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 34(2), 229-235.

Hill, E., & Frith, U. (2003). Understanding autism: insights from mind and brain. Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, 358(1430), 281-289.

McIntosh, D., Reichmann-Decker, A., Winkielman, P., Wilbargeret, J. L. (2006). When the social mirror breaks: deficits in automatic, but not voluntary, mimicry of emotional facial expressions in autism. Developmental Science, 9(3), 295-302.

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What is empathy?

Cycling
[Photo by messtiza]
Some of the most striking discoveries in psychology have come from patients with deficits of various kinds. Phineas Gage, one of the most famous patients in psychology, was thought to have suffered emotional blunting - along with personality changes - after a tamping rod was propelled through his frontal lobes. Less dramatically, but no less vitally, it seems highly probable that common psychological disorders have, at their heart, a problem processing emotions. Two examples are alexithymia and autism spectrum disorders, both of which seem to involve problems with empathising. But what is empathy?

Like many terms in psychology, it can seem intuitively obvious what 'empathy' means, but on closer inspection the definition is not so clear. de Vignemont and Singer (2006) identify two strands in the literature; the first of which provides a broad definition of empathy as occurring when an affective response is more appropriate to another person. The second, which de Vignemont and Singer (2006) prefer, is much narrower and requires that:
  • you feel a particular affective state
  • this state feels similar to you and the 'target' of your empathy, but has different causes,
  • it stems from you watching or imagining the target's affective state,
  • you realise your affective state is a result of empathy.
de Vignemont and Singer (2006) argue that this definition allows a distinction to be made between empathy and 'cognitive perspective taking'.

Automatic empathising?

These definitions of empathy beg the question of how much control we have over our empathising. Individual differences aside for a moment, generally do we automatically empathise with those around us, or is there some extra effort involved? The process model of appraisal, discussed previously on PsyBlog, certainly suggests there is some level of automatism to our emotional processing. In this theory, perceptual components can lead directly, and unconsciously, into appraisal processes and from there to an emotional response.

Neuroscience work reported by de Vignemont and Singer (2006) supports this hypothesis. Studies have found that when people see complete strangers enduring pain, their brain activation responds in a typically empathetic fashion (Morrison, Lloyd, di Pellegrino & Roberts, 2004).

Contextual empathising

But as de Vignemont and Singer (2006) point out, this indiscriminate empathising must be modulated by situational factors otherwise our emotional lives would be a constant riot of confusion. Similarly, the process model of appraisal does not exclusively rely on perception as the sole input for emotional responses, it also takes into account 'associatively activated representations' and 'the contents of focal awareness'. Secondly, and importantly for the process model of appraisal, de Vignemont and Singer (2006) argue that empathy can be 'fast and implicit'.

de Vignemont and Singer (2006) also suggest a number of categories which may help to explain why some of us empathise with others in some contexts but not in others:
  • Intrinsic emotional factors - e.g. some emotions may be intrinsically easier to empathise with.
  • Relational factors - like appraisal theory de Vignemont and Singer (2006) point out that the relationship between empathiser and target will have an important effect.
  • Individual differences
  • Situational factors

Early or late appraisal?

The process model of appraisal suggests an early model of appraisal. This means that both the emotional cue and the context are evaluated by appraisal processes before an emotional response is created. The alternative is a late model model which includes a direct link from an emotional cue to an emotional reponse, thereby bypassing appraisal processes. de Vignemont and Singer (2006) point out that there is little current evidence to distinguish between these two paths.

Whatever the process by which empathy operates, it is clearly a vital part of effective social functioning. Just how vital is the subject of constant debate. Many have suggested that empathy increases prosocial behaviour, de Vignemont and Singer (2006) argue that empathy increases social coherence and social communication. Conversely, a lack of empathy is associated with antisocial and aggressive behaviour.

In the next post, I'll move on to look at the research into those disorders which seem to incur an empathy deficit, e.g. alexithymia and autism spectrum disorders.

de Vignemont, F., & Singer, T. (2006). The empathic brain: how, when and why? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(10), 435-41.

Morrison, I., Lloyd, D., di Pellegrino, G., & Roberts, N. (2004). Vicarious responses to pain in anterior cingulate cortex: is empathy a multisensory issue. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci, 4(2), 270-8.

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A Process Model of Appraisal

Head Wheel
[Photo by zen]
Recently I've been looking at the causes of emotions as suggested by appraisal theory. Very briefly, this theory posits that our emotions are generated through an evaluation of particular types of information that are relevant to us. But what does 'evaluation' mean and how does this occur?

It's quite clear that sometimes these evaluations or appraisals of both our own state, and that of the outside world, occur very quickly. One of the reasons appraisal theory has been criticised is for failing to explain how these lightning fast evaluations can occur. After all, the theory might be read as implying that we have to think consciously about every appraisal, when this often isn't either necessary or even possible. Emotional changes that appear to have no apparent (conscious) cause, or that occur in the blink of an eye, are familiar to all of us. If so, how can appraisal theories hope to explain these phenomenon?

The answer lies in the construction of a process model of appraisal. Smith and Kirby (2001) have presented just such a process model which attempts to explain these phenomena. At its heart is a split between two modes of emotional processing:
  • Associative processing: a fast, parallel processing mode characterised by spreading activation based on memory. This type of processing occurs outside focal awareness.
  • Reasoning: a slow, serial type of processing that occurs within focal awareness and requires an active effort.
For those of you familiar with cognitive psychology this will be a familiar dichotomy.

The diagram below shows all the components of the model with the line marked 'reasoning' representing the slow, serial processing. All the other connections rely on associative processing and occur outside focal awareness (Smith & Kirby, 2001, p. 130).

Appraisal Process Model


Smith and Kirby (2001) point out some important features of their model:
  • From the diagram it can be seen that appraisals come from three sources: the contents of focal awareness, perceived stimuli and associatively activated representations.
  • 'Appraisal detectors' then integrate this information producing both subjective affect as well as further activating associated representations (affective priming).
  • Associative and reasoning processes differ in their ability to access other information. Smith and Kirby (2001) argue that reasoning processes only have access to information that has been encoded semantically whereas associative processes have access to all types of memory.
  • The model provides an map for the unconscious/implicit processing of emotion and how it influences other areas of consciousness.
While I'd like to tell you about a whole series of empirical studies that have found support for this model, I can't because they don't exist. There are, however, some recent studies that provide some evidence for a functional distinction between implicit and explicit emotional processes. I will discuss these in future posts (research on alexithymia and autisim spectrum disorders).

This model of emotional processing belongs to the ever-growing family of two-process theories in cognitive psychology (e.g. Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968). These describe an important distinction between two types of process. But, while I doubt they represent the final solution, they do at least provide a useful way of thinking about how the mind processes information. We will, however, have to wait for further evidence of whether this type of model is justified in describing how we process emotional information.

References

Atkinson, R., & Shiffrin, R. (1968). Human memory: A proposed system and its control processes. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 2, 89-195.

Smith, C. A., & Kirby, L. D. (2001) Toward delivering on the promise of appraisal theory. In: K. Scherer, A. Schorr, T. Johnstone (Eds.). Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Daniel Tammet, The Boy With The Incredible Brain

Daniel TammetHaving now seen the excellent documentary on the autistic savant, Daniel Tammet, and noting the subject's popularity, I've done a little Googling to get some more information for you...

This is the BBC News report of Daniel Tammet's attempt at the British and European record for reciting pi. This article goes some way towards explaining how Daniel Tammet is able to remember 22,511 decimal places of pi without using any special memory techniques.

'The Savant Syndrome' provides more background information on autistic savants. The article is by Dr. Darold Treffert who is widely published on this subject and was a consultant to the movie Rain Man. More on other autistic savants at Wikipedia.

New York Times review of the documentary.
Science Channel 'Brainman' site [contains extra video not in programme]

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The Boy With The Incredible Brain

For those of you in the UK, there's an interesting TV programme on tonight about an autistic savant called Daniel Tammet [a previous post on PsyBlog]. This documentary has had some excellent reviews in the US where it has already been aired. It's on Channel 5 at 9pm this evening.
Focus (the production company)

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Autistic savant explains his incredible abilities

"Daniel Tammet is an autistic savant. He can perform mind-boggling mathematical calculations at breakneck speeds. But unlike other savants, who can perform similar feats, Tammet can describe how he does it. He speaks seven languages and is even devising his own language. Now scientists are asking whether his exceptional abilities are the key to unlock the secrets of autism."

From The Guardian

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Parents of person with Asperger's lost hope

Suicide, actual and suspected, has been in the news all week. The story of Bill and Wendy Ainscow is similarly tragic. Their daughter has Asperger syndrome, a type of autism normally situated at the less severe end of the spectrum.

Asperger's typically manifests itself in a difficulty communicating, problems forming and maintaining relationships and a lack of imagination. In many cases it is possible to live a relatively normal and fruitful life with this condition. The circumstances of this family however were different.
> From The Independent

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