A Process Model of Appraisal
Recently I've been looking at the causes of emotions as suggested by appraisal theory. Very briefly, this theory posits that our emotions are generated through an evaluation of particular types of information that are relevant to us. But what does 'evaluation' mean and how does this occur?It's quite clear that sometimes these evaluations or appraisals of both our own state, and that of the outside world, occur very quickly. One of the reasons appraisal theory has been criticised is for failing to explain how these lightning fast evaluations can occur. After all, the theory might be read as implying that we have to think consciously about every appraisal, when this often isn't either necessary or even possible. Emotional changes that appear to have no apparent (conscious) cause, or that occur in the blink of an eye, are familiar to all of us. If so, how can appraisal theories hope to explain these phenomenon?
The answer lies in the construction of a process model of appraisal. Smith and Kirby (2001) have presented just such a process model which attempts to explain these phenomena. At its heart is a split between two modes of emotional processing:
- Associative processing: a fast, parallel processing mode characterised by spreading activation based on memory. This type of processing occurs outside focal awareness.
- Reasoning: a slow, serial type of processing that occurs within focal awareness and requires an active effort.
The diagram below shows all the components of the model with the line marked 'reasoning' representing the slow, serial processing. All the other connections rely on associative processing and occur outside focal awareness (Smith & Kirby, 2001, p. 130).
Smith and Kirby (2001) point out some important features of their model:
- From the diagram it can be seen that appraisals come from three sources: the contents of focal awareness, perceived stimuli and associatively activated representations.
- 'Appraisal detectors' then integrate this information producing both subjective affect as well as further activating associated representations (affective priming).
- Associative and reasoning processes differ in their ability to access other information. Smith and Kirby (2001) argue that reasoning processes only have access to information that has been encoded semantically whereas associative processes have access to all types of memory.
- The model provides an map for the unconscious/implicit processing of emotion and how it influences other areas of consciousness.
This model of emotional processing belongs to the ever-growing family of two-process theories in cognitive psychology (e.g. Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968). These describe an important distinction between two types of process. But, while I doubt they represent the final solution, they do at least provide a useful way of thinking about how the mind processes information. We will, however, have to wait for further evidence of whether this type of model is justified in describing how we process emotional information.
ReferencesAtkinson, R., & Shiffrin, R. (1968). Human memory: A proposed system and its control processes. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 2, 89-195.
Smith, C. A., & Kirby, L. D. (2001) Toward delivering on the promise of appraisal theory. In: K. Scherer, A. Schorr, T. Johnstone (Eds.). Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Appraisal Processes in Emotion
The best known modern theory conceptualising emotional states concentrates on two dimensions: valence and arousal. Valence refers to whether you feel positive or negative and arousal refers to physiological 'excitement'. This model has been extremely popular probably because it provides a relatively simple way of researching emotions that can at least provide some answers. Rage, for example, can be considered an emotion that is high on both negative affect as well as arousal.
While this model is useful in some senses, it's clear that there are a number of serious problems. Chief amongst these is the question of how emotions that apparently have quite distinct characteristics - like fear and anger - can be accounted for on these two dimensions.
Going beyond this there are a wide range of questions that you might want to ask about the emotions which seem intrinsically too complicated to explain within this simple model. For example, how come the same event provokes different emotional reactions in different people? Or, in what sense is emotion irrational? How are our emotions (largely) appropriate to the situations in which we find ourselves?
Appraisal theory
These are all questions which Roseman & Smith (2001) argue stand a better chance of being answered with a theory based around 'appraisals'. At the heart of appraisal theory is the idea that the particular judgements we make about particular parts of the outside world, and ourselves, are what causes emotions.
Appraisal theory appears to have the potential to answer many of the questions posed about emotions. For example, people's individual patterns of appraisal could explain the differences in emotional reactions to the same event. Appraisal theory seems to provide a good way of connecting the situation we are in with our emotional reactions.
Like many modern theories in psychology appraisal has an evolutionary dimension. Returning to anger and how it can be conceptualised, one particular appraisal theory posits that differentiating anger from sadness can be seen as adaptive with respect to our motivations. If we find ourselves in a situation which is appraised negatively and there is no relevant action, for example a bereavement, we experience sadness. On the other hand we may experience anger when there is a relevant action that may be of benefit - for example . Sadness tends to encourage passivity, while anger encourages activity (Roseman & Smith, 2001).
This suggested explanation of anger also touches on the relational aspect of appraisal theory. Our situational appraisals appear to be highly dependent on our motives and goals (Roseman & Smith, 2001). In other words, how we feel depends on what's important to us, indeed all our appraisals are connected to what we want and, therefore, to how we feel.
What kind of a thing is an appraisal though? Is it a thought, an emotion itself, how can we think about it? Roseman & Smith (2001) argue an appraisal can be thought of as a kind of perception. Like vision or touch it is a kind of information processing channel which works at a relatively low level. This may help to explain why our emotional responses to certain situations often seem beyond our control. Perhaps appraisals are analogous to vision in the sense that we can make particular judgements about what we see, but we can't choose how we see - that is an automatic process.
Structural vs. process theories of appraisal
Roseman & Smith (2001) make the distinction between two types of appraisal theories. Firstly there are structural theories which concentrate on picking apart the evaluations we make. Secondly there are process-orientated models which concentrate on the actual operation of emotional processes. It is one such process-orientated model that I'll be moving on to discuss in the next post where I'll be discussing in more detail how conscious and unconscious emotional processes fit together with appraisals.
Roseman, I. J., Smith, C. A. (2001) Appraisal Theory. In: K. Scherer, A. Schorr, T. Johnstone (Eds.). Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Labels: Emotion