Powerful Music

Cello
[Photo by Nite773]
Last night at the Barbican I was privileged to hear the world premiere of a new piece by Jonathan Dove called Hojoki. The work is based on an autobiographical story by Kamo no Chomei, a Buddhist monk who lived in the 13th century. Written in 1212, Hojoki tells of his move from Kyoto to escape the constant threat of natural and man-made disasters in the city. In this composition, the story was narrated by a countertenor soloist with the orchestra providing dramatic colour. For me it was extremely moving and the rest of audience seemed to think so as well. But, why does music have the power to access deeper parts of ourselves, to strike at the heart of what it means to be human?

The power of music is a theme taken up by Oliver Sacks, writing a commentary in the neurology journal 'Brain'. Sacks (2006) explains how Parkinsonian patients, normally subject to a startling range of involuntary movements, can sometimes be stilled by music. Similarly, sufferers from Tourette's syndrome, through music, can be temporarily relieved from their tics. Even those with advanced dementia, whose ability to experience strong emotions appears to have been eroded, are sometimes transported by familiar songs.

Not only can music release some patients from their motor or cognitive dysfunction, but, for others, music is almost too powerful. Those with 'Williams Syndrome' appear hypersensitive to the emotional impact of music. Sacks (2006) describes witnessing a group of young people with the syndrome crying uncontrollably to sad music.

The reactions of those with Williams Syndrome hints at the darker side of our special sensitivity to music. Sacks (2006) describes how musical hallucinations affect at least 2% of the population with some reporting songs looping in their heads. A few seem to be having the real experience of hearing music, which can initiate a fruitless search for the hidden source. At the most extreme, for some with epilepsy, music can even cause seizures, especially when its content has particularly rich emotional connections for the hearer.

To Sacks these findings suggest a special role for music in the brain:
"Our auditory systems, our nervous systems, are tuned for music. Perhaps we are a musical species no less than a linguistic one. But there seems to be in us a peculiar sensitivity to music, a sensitivity that can all too easily slip out of control, become excessive, become a susceptibility or a vulnerability. Too-muchness lies continually in wait, whether this takes the form of 'earworms', musical hallucinations, swoons and trances, or music-induced seizures. This is the other side of the otherwise wonderful power of music." (Sacks, 2006:2532)
Music has been a hot topic in the psyblog-o-sphere over the last few weeks. I found Sack's article through Brainethics. Mixing Memory tells us that monkeys are not fans of Mozart. Cognitive Daily has a couple of posts on human musical preferences and whether it's affected by expertise (first, second). Also, music cognition now also has its own blog called Sound and Mind.

Sacks, O. (2006) The power of music. Brain, 129, 2528-2532. (Abstract)

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What's Our Motivation?

Wormhole
[Photo by clickykbd]
Motivation is at once one of the most exciting and one of the most troubling areas of psychology. In asking what makes us human, motivation seems to hold the key to some of the most profound questions about our existence. And yet, by asking what drives human nature, it also exposes our dark hearts.

Vansteenkiste & Sheldon (2006) touch on these ideas in an article published in The British Journal of Clinical Psychology which attempts an integration of Self-Determination Theory (SDT) and Motivational Interviewing (MI). In this article the authors look for, and find, many commonalities between these two theories. It turns out SDT has a considerable theoretical contribution to make towards MI, which, itself, was largely an intuitive atheoretical creation.

Still, I find myself with mixed feelings about this article. One major reason why I admire Vansteenkiste & Sheldon's (2006) work is that it focuses on the integration of ideas. It searches for, and finds, links between the theoretical and practical domains such that each is informed by the other. Bearing in mind previous discussions on unity in psychology, this has to be applauded.

On the other hand, for me there is a problem with the fundamental assumptions of both SDT and MI. As essentially humanistic theories, they assume people already have the potential for positive change within them. In other words, by implication, it assumes people will choose goals and behaviours that are good for them.

Goals, presumably, come from needs. SDT identifies three main needs for which humans search. The first is a need for competence, the second a need for autonomy and the third a need for relatedness. All three, apparently good, positive, humanistic needs. Admittedly SDT does not constrain the world of motivational drives to just these three, but nevertheless these are thought, within this theory, to be the most important. Does that really cover everything?

For me it is difficult to reconcile even a small proportion of the human evil in the world with these three needs. Perhaps I'm not being creative enough: when I kill people I want to be good at it, to choose who I kill and to have backup. Does that satisfy the needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness?

Pulling my head back out of the clouds and thinking about the implementation of MI, however, there is an argument that this meta-theoretical quibbling is not practically relevant. SDT is a content-free theory so clients and therapists choose those motivations which are applied. Theoretically, then, it would be possible to use it to implant any types of motivation in another person; although, of course, if these were detrimental to the individual, extremely unethical. We would then have to assume the therapist discerns what is good for the client, or can help the client towards that realisation.

Vansteenkiste, M., & Sheldon, K. M. (2006). There's nothing more practical than a good theory: integrating motivational interviewing and self-determination theory. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 45, 63-82. (Abstract)

Why Do People Participate in Research?

Crowd
[Photo by Thomas Hawk]
The BPS Research Digest recently drew my attention to a study published in Personality and Individual Differences, which has relevance for all types of psychological research. It asks a fundamental question: what types of people participate in research?

Many psychology undergraduates are forced to take part in experiments as a requirement of their courses. And, famously, the large majority of psychology studies are carried out on undergraduates. But there are still a whole other group of people who willingly give up their time. Why? Who would give their free time away for a study that appears to have minimal benefit for them? As a researcher, depending on what you're studying, this could have important implications for your research.

Pagana, Eatonb, Turkheimerc & Oltmanns (2006), come up with a potentially disturbing answer. Narcissists are over-represented amongst non-participators, as are those low on assertiveness. On the other hand, those high on obsessive-compulsive, histrionic, self-sacrificing and intrusive/needy measures are more likely to participate. I say disturbing because, to give one example, estimates of personality disorders are based on population samples which, this research suggests, have a significant bias.

More generally, though, it doesn't hurt researchers to be cynical about the motivations of participants. When asking why people choose, or refuse, to take part in psychological research, the answers are likely to surprise both investigators and participants themselves alike.

Pagana, Eatonb, Turkheimerc & Oltmanns (2006) Peer-reported personality problems of research nonparticipants: Are our samples biased? (Abstract)

Unity: Toward a Useful Mass Movement

Mass Movement
[Photo by Hugo]
As promised the unity debate continues (start here) with a look at the whole second issue in the Journal of Clinical Psychology. Rather than summarising the articles - you can read the abstracts yourself - I've given each one a (very) short and personal review which will hopefully point the generalist in the right direction for further reading.

As Henriques (2005) points out in his introduction to the second special issue, theoretical unification of psychology is a highly contentious issue. Nevertheless, support arrives, firstly for the use of Behavioural Investment Theory from both Rand & Iliardi (2005) and Geary (2005). And, secondly, for the justification hypothesis from Shaffer (2005), Quackenbush (2005) and Shealy (2005).

Rand & Illiardi (2005) Toward a consilient science of psychology (Abstract)

An excellent, clear exposition of the tensions within psychology and how Henriques' metatheoretical ideas can be evaluated. Sees cognitive neuroscience as a "...consilient bridge between psychology and the natural sciences". Highly recommended for those looking for a birds-eye view.


Geary (2005) The motivation to control and the origin of mind: Exploring the life-mind joint point in the Tree of Knowledge System (Abstract)

Geary finds striking similarities between his 'motivation-to-control' model and Henriques' . Detailed support for the Behavioural Investment Theory. Technical.

Schaffer (2005) From mirror self-recognition to the looking-glass self: Exploring the Justification Hypothesis (Abstract)

Reviews how the ToK helps to link sociological findings to psychology. Examines the work of George Herbert Mead and Charles Horton Cooley in this context. Focuses on the 'looking-glass self'. Open and informative reflection. Recommended.

Quackenbush (2005) Remythologizing culture: Narrativity, justification, and the politics of personalization (Abstract)

Addresses a problem that struck me as insurmountable in an earlier post on unity, namely, how will social constructionists ever accept a unifying theory of psychology? Alternately expressed, how can humanistic and scientific traditions be brought together? Starts with a fabulous quote from Martin Luther King Jr (1968) which I can't resist reproducing:
"...you who are in the field of psychology have given us a great word. It is the word 'maladjusted' [...] there are some things in our society, some things in our world, to which we should never be adjusted."
The article, however, turns out to be quote-heavy which reduced the readability for me. Or, perhaps, it was more because it was addressing issues that are not of primary importance to me.

Shealy (2005) Justifying the Justification Hypothesis: Scientific-humanism, Equilintegration (EI) Theory, and the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory (BEVI) (Abstract)

The magic word for this article is 'operationalise', this is the spiritual twin of the Geary (2005) article. A closer look, then, here at how the 'justification hypothesis' can be operationalised using Shealy's Equilintegration (EI) Theory, and the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory (BEVI). Practical.

Slife (2005) Testing the limits of Henriques' proposal: Wittgensteinian lessons and hermeneutic dialogue (Abstract)

Henriques' unification attempt is compared to that carried out by personality researchers who aim for subsuming theories. Unfortunately, Slife (2005) argues, it is impossible to subsume everyone's theories - this leads to those on the outside being marginalised. Critical of whether qualitative researchers will accept an all-embracing theory.

Doesn't appear to be a direct attack on the ToK system on its own terms but more of a rehearsal of social constructionist viewpoints and why they are incompatible. Clearly written.

Henriques (2005) Toward a useful mass movement (Abstract)

The final word goes to Gregg Henriques who replies to his critics, politely but firmly. Along the way he explains most of the ideas, arguments and criticisms for which I have been groping as I read the two special issues, and many more that passed me by. Sets out the course for the future. Clearly written, highly recommended.

Looking Back and Forward

To me, when looking at all the articles both for and against the ToK system covered here it all comes down to one thing. If you look for commonalities between different areas, sub-disciplines or methodologies within psychology then you'll find them. If you look for differences, then, again, you'll find them. That's the nature of psychology. It's way too early to tell whether Henriques' theory will work or not.

It's like trying to do a 1,000 piece jigsaw with only 35 of the pieces. You can rearrange the pieces all you like and argue about which configuration will build the complete picture. Ultimately, though, you've only got 35 pieces and you have to do the best you can with them until a few more come along. To entirely deny even the possibility of a big picture, effectively what some are suggesting, seems the height of arrogance.

The real question to ask is whether the task of unifying psychology is worthwhile. If it is, then it will be done. If not, it won't. No amount of sniping from the trenches will change the fact that if researchers, theoreticians or practitioners can show practical benefit from a unified theory, many will jump on the bandwagon.

For my part, I hope a concerted effort is made towards unity, even if a macro view of psychology cannot ultimately 'subsume' all areas of psychology, that doesn't mean the attempt shouldn't be made. Who wouldn't want a clearer picture?

There is now a Wikipedia article on the ToK by Henriques

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Vehicles Pass Closer to Helmeted Cyclists

Chainrings
[Photo by Jason Rogers]
Here's a subject close to my heart: cycling. Not least because I'm a keen cyclist myself but also because cycling is good in so many different ways - but I'm not going to bang on about that now. This study, however, has some counter-intuitive findings (the best kind!) about helmet wearing that seems to suggest cars pass closer if you've got a lid on. Also, and in stark contrast to conventional wisdom among experienced cyclists, riding further away from the curb does not cause road users to leave more space when over-taking.

Here's the suggested explanation for the 'helmet-effect':
"Research suggests drivers tend to believe helmeted cyclists are more serious and less likely to make unexpected moves; the helmet effect seen here is likely a behavioural manifestation of this belief."
And on the riding position:
"The riding-position effect suggests drivers simply do not change their overtaking paths very much as a function of where a rider is: if a cyclist rides further into the road, they will on average be closer to passing vehicles as a result. However, there are also plenty of reasons why riders should not just stick to the road edge, e.g., debris, car doors, and drivers' attention patterns at junctions."
Oh, and when the experimenter wore a wig, it seemed to have a repellent effect on other road users. That, I'm less surprised about.

Walker (In press) Drivers overtaking bicyclists: Objective data on the effects of riding position, helmet use, vehicle type and apparent gender. (Press Release | Overview of results [PDF])
Cognitive Daily asks whether this research might hold good in the US

Reflecting on Unity

Reflection
[Photo by Steve Wall]
For those of you finding the discussion on unity in psychology a little dry (surely not!?!), I have good news: this is the penultimate post in the series. In the next I will foolishly attempt to summarise and comment on all of the articles in the second special issue of the Journal of Clinical Psychology. This is not, of course, the end of the discussion, just the beginning, but simply touching on this subject has opened my eyes to a wealth of debates within psychology. I want to reflect on this briefly.

My impression has been that this subject attracts little interest precisely because it is, at the same time, both everyone's problem and no one's problem. The strongest criticisms of Henriques' proposals point to organisational and political inertia: we don't like change, we are comfortable the way things are; motivation for change can be difficult to access.

For me, though, the idea that psychology should have a broadly accepted macro-level view sticks in my mind as something that could, and should, exist. Many psychologists, while not necessarily being interested in the broad idea of unity, are interested in how their own work fits into the big picture. And here I return to Sternberg & Grigorenko's (2001) bottom-up approach to unity. It is when psychologists use diverse methodologies and look for links across sub-disciplines, that some of the best work is produced.

Looking to the future, the question of whether unity in psychology will be based on Henriques' ideas is one to be worked out over time. At least the debate continues: if we have no debate, we have no progress.

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