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Unity: Support From Cognitive Science

Linear Tess
[Photo by Melisande]
Stanovich (2004a) agrees with two central points of Henriques' argument (start here). Firstly that human cognitive architecture can be split into 'two broad domains': quick-acting, unconscious parallel processes and logical-analytic processing, which is linear, slower and conscious. Secondly, Stanovich (2004a) agrees that the differences between humans and other animals are central to psychology.

Taking the 'two broad domains' first, these are seen in cognitive psychology in a number of dual-process theories that have been developed: Stanovich (2004b) identifies 22 of them. How have these dual-processes arisen? Some evolutionary psychologists argue that hypothetical thinking was selected for as it allowed humans to understand other minds. Hypothetical thinking allows a person to imagine 'possible states of the world'.

Hypothetical thinking is also central, in Stanovich's view to the difference between humans and animals rather than Henriques' justification processes. Metarepresentational abilities, or 'thinking about thinking', represent the 'cognitive divide' between humans and animals. This is where Stanovich (2004a) takes issue with Henriques although he does agree that justification processes could have been involved in the development of metarepresentational abilities.

Stanovich (2004a) Metarepresentation and the great cognitive divide: a commentary on Henriques' "psychology defined" (Abstract)
Stanovich (2004b) The Robot's Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin (Amazon)

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Unity: Avoiding Critical Reflection?

The harshest criticism I've yet read of Henriques' bid to unify psychology (starting here) comes from Stephen Yanchar. He sees Henriques' work as an attempt to repackage extant theoretical perspectives and sidestep critical reflection.

Yanchar (2004) draws attention to the literature that cautions against unification. Indeed, the idea of unity would 'force psychology into a theoretical straightjacket'. Henriques' model is described as: 'rigid', 'exclusive' and 'disciplinary agenda setting'. More important than unification, for Yanchar (2004:1280) is: "...a continual dialogue among psychologists from diverse research communities," and, "...the pursuit of truth..."

I'm bursting with questions. How can psychologists from diverse research communities communicate with each other if they don't speak the same language? What is this pursuit of truth? Isn't unification a kind of truth? Anyway, how does one small step towards a macro-level theory suddenly curtail the search for truth or put psychology in a straightjacket?

Sounds like someone is comfortable in his ghetto and doesn't want to move.

Yanchar (2004) Some discontents with theoretical unification (Abstract)

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Unity: A Noble Quest

Knight
[Photo by scalleja]
Recently, in the search for unity in psychology (starting here) we've hit quite a lot of naysayers: psychology is already unified, it doesn't need unification, it's impossible, it's pointless, it's missing the point. Today, before I completely give up hope, the case for the defence (or is it prosecution?). In either case, a few hardy souls are happy to stand up and say, yes, things could be different, and perhaps it could even be better. Good for them.

I'll start with Paul Gilbert who, healthily in this context, was an economist who retrained as a psychologist. Where, he asked when studying psychology, is the macro-level approach that economists have already accepted is required?
"One may take issue with some of the specifics of Henriques' approach [...but...] this kind of thinking should not be reserved for some specialized or graduate course but should be center stage to our thinking, model building, and teaching of psychology. [...] Psychology is gradually coming to grips with a need for a macro science of mind. Henriques has done a fine job in carrying this torch forward." (Gilbert, 2004:1226)
That sums up my view perfectly.

Lawrence Calhoun also provides solace for the weary and brow-beaten unifier. Unity in psychology is a noble quest, Calhoun (2004) says, but one which will require significant work. Whether unity can occur or will be 'allowed' is a different matter. Calhoun identifies a variety of theoretical, social, cultural, economic and political factors that will be influential.

One of these points, while not the strongest of them, has particular resonance with me. That is the increasing number of psychologists holding what might be termed post-modern, or highly relativistic viewpoints, which are fundamentally opposed to any kind of unification. That is going to be a tough audience.

Gilbert (2004) A much needed macro level view - a commentary on Henriques' "Psychology defined" (Abstract)
Calhoun (2004) The unification of psychology: a noble quest (Abstract)

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Unity: Psychology is the Mother of All Sciences

A philosophical response to Henriques comes from Jack Presbury who wants to give the Tree of Knowledge a good shake. This article is superficially attractive not least because he states:
"The Big Bang and the dinosaurs may have been here long before we humans were, but if we hadn't come along, they might as well have not existed, because nobody would know about it. The basic epistemological issue is that nothing could be known if we humans did not have the capacity to know. Everything is psychology. It is psychology - not physics - that is the mother of all sciences."
What could be a more appealing statement to a psychologist? It's the physicists who should have psychology envy!

Expanding on this a little, and placing it within Henriques' model, Presbury (2004) refers to Heidegger's (1956) argument that metaphysics is at the base of the tree of knowledge. Heidegger's 'Dasein' or 'being-in-the-world' is a necessary precursor to scientific knowledge despite science's claim that it has no point of view, or is the "view from nowhere" (Nagel, 1986:14). He suggests mind should not only be at the base of the model but everywhere up and down it.

References

> Heidegger, M. (1956) The way back into the ground of metaphysics. In W. Kaufmann (Ed.), Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (pp. 206-221). Cleveland: Meridian Books.

> Nagel, T. (1986) The view from nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press.
While I like the idea Presbury puts forward, I think unity in psychology is going to seem like an even more far-fetched idea if we place it on a philosophical footing like this.

Any kind of theoretical solidity immediately evaporates as soon as we can't even pretend to believe in some reasonably constrained version of an objective truth. For example: do you think there is a brain inside your skull? Does this fact change with point of view? No.

I'd like to believe that psychology was the mother of all sciences, but frankly that is just physics envy.

Presbury, J. (2004) Rooting the tree of knowledge: A response to Henriques' "Psychology Defined" (Abstract)
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Unity: Fuzzy Terminology

Fuzzy
[Photo by larryosan]
More criticism of attempts to unify psychology which, as you will see, don't much impress me. Lilienfeld (2004) responds to Henriques' article by asking whether attempting to define psychology is worth the trouble. Lilienfeld (2004) argues that there is little utility in defining psychology more precisely - after all biologists (apparently) have some difficulty in defining what life is. The word 'psychology' is inherently 'fuzzy' and unity would simply encourage 'turf-wars' between psychology and sociology, ethology and so on.

My response: Don't pretend there aren't different levels of satisfaction with a definition. I would guess the biologist would be able to define biology, however imprecisely, much quicker than the psychologist would be able to define psychology. No one is claiming that biology is perfectly unified, what Henriques argues is that biology is relatively more unified or, alternatively, less disorganised, than psychology.

I also don't think that the encouragement of 'turf-wars' is a justifiable reason to avoid defining psychology. Imagine: "Let's not define psychology properly, it might cause trouble." Surely you've got to have some common ground before you can start a proper argument - otherwise all the shouting is pointless.

The second prong of Lilienfeld (2004) argument is aimed at Henriques' claim that unity in psychology will help to narrow the gap between research and practice. Lilienfeld (2004) argues, however, that there is a group of clinical psychologists who would hang on to their belief in 'clinical intuition' whatever theoretical unifying rabbits were pulled out of the hat. Instead better training is required.

My response: Perhaps it is the very disunity and disorganisation of psychology that repels clinical psychologists from the scientific side of the discipline. However much you tell someone to refer to the research literature, if it's incomprehensibly fragmented then it's going to be practically useless in real life clinical situations. Training, presumably in the form of forcing noses into the academic journals, won't solve the problem.

Lilienfeld (2004) Defining Psychology: Is It Worth the Trouble? (Abstract)
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Unity in Psychology: The Search Starts Here

Head
[Photo by DerrickT]
When I started my first psychology course I couldn't understand the separation between the different subjects, or disciplines, in psychology. Developmental psychologists aren't that much different from cognitive psychologists - they both study mental events and processes - but one almost never refers to the other. Why?

My first impression was that psychology's disciplines were simply an historical accident, whose momentum had not yet dissipated. But a series of articles I discovered on unity in psychology began to open my eyes to myriad discussion about unity in psychology.

Follow the search from the start:Mixing Memory has responded to this discussion.


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Unity: The Cognitive Revolution Unifies

I Love Cognitive Science
[Photo by CSSA at UCSD]
Thank Kihlstrom (2004), some clarity. I've just been reading his response to Henriques' proposals for a unified psychology, and the man talks a lot of sense. Although he's not totally dismissive of what Henriques' has to say, he thinks that psychology has, in effect, already been unified, to the extent that it's possible, by the cognitive revolution.

This is, however, being threatened by 'a centrifugal tendency' that is causing psychology 'to carve itself up into new disciplines'. Current divisions are often for political reasons, providing further support for the institutional/organisational hypothesis, rather than because these researchers are necessarily working outside psychology - although some of them are.

Essentially, though, Kihlstrom (2004) argues that psychology is the science of mental life. Psychology, like all other sciences, has connections out and crosses over, but this is its unifying core. The message is acceptance. Yes, fields cross-over, some psychologists connecting 'down' to biology, some 'up' to the social sciences. That, he says, is the way things will always be as psychology moves out to form new branches. The loose definition of psychology enables new research to have huge scope.

Some funky quotes:
"...psychology is not just something to do until the neurologist comes."
And for those of you addicted to neuroimaging studies:
"...physiology is a tool for psychology, but it is not an obligation."
Kihlstrom (2004) Unity Within Psychology, and Unity Between Science and Practice. (Abstract)
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ARRGGHHH We're All Going to Die!

Argh
[Photo by Sir Frog]
London is currently the centre of world attention as security forces claim to have foiled a terrorist plot to bomb a number of civilian aircraft. In response the media has gone into special-event overdrive which usually involves: a) endless repetition of the same sketchy information and b) pointless graphics attempting to cover up for a lack of cold hard facts. Not that I've been watching or reading any of it - I don't see the point.

Special news events only serve to display in even starker contrast how little most of the news really matters to the average person who isn't directly affected. And yet people are glued to it, why? I mentioned three psychological theories in relation to last year's tube and bus bombings. These theories are useful but don't tell the whole story.

Perhaps there are, in fact, more disasters nowadays than there used to be. While this immediately smacks of seeing the past through rose-tinted contacts, according to figures from Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, this might be true. Between 1970 and 1979, 1,230 disasters were registered, while more than 3,000 disasters were reported between 2000 and 2003. Perhaps the world really is getting more disaster prone.

And then there's the other culprit: media hype*. The media runs on hype, it's what they live for and it's what keeps them alive. Take the hype out of the media and you get, well, The Independent (sorry, I love it really). So if the media need their hype the same way I need food, oxygen and House M.D.), what harm does it do?

It's very difficult to tell. Vasterman, Yzermans & Dirkzwager (2005) say there have only been a handful of studies carried out and still there is little concrete evidence. Given the nature of the problem, that's probably the way it will remain. Despite this, they do point to some correlational evidence that connects depression and post-traumatic stress disorder with viewing 'disaster-related television'. I certainly wouldn't bet against it.

*Although the term 'media hype' doesn't have much scientific currency at present, Vasterman (2005) is trying to change that with his theoretical framework.

Vasterman, Yzermans & Dirkzwager (2005) The Role of the Media and Media Hypes in the Aftermath of Disasters (Abstract | Full Text PDF)

Vasterman (2005) Media-Hype: Self-Reinforcing News Waves, Journalistic Standards and the Construction of Social Problems (Abstract)

Unity: Disorganisation in Psychology


Continuing my investigation of unity in psychology - whether it's possible, why it's not there already, what can be done about it - I've discovered another supporter of the institutional/organisational hypothesis of psychology's woes.

Katzko (2004) points out that psychology is a 'federation of sub-disciplines' and that diversity is not problem, instead it is psychology's disorganisation that needs addressing. Katzko (2002) argues that this type of disorganisation is actually created by a discontent about the methodological basis of psychology.

To use a primitive analogy: members of each tribe in psychological research keep to their own tools for hunting. It's the use of the same tools that provide the social bonds that keeps the epistemological groups together.

Katzko (2004) goes on to say that psychology doesn't need unification in a top-down method but rather unification bubbles up from below.

Both of these arguments seems to me to be much the same as already made by Sternberg & Grigorenko (2001).

Katzko (2004) Psychology's dilemma: an institutional neurosis? (Abstract)
Katzko (2002) The rhetoric of psychological research and the problem of unification in psychology. (Abstract)
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Rise of Psychological Research on the Internet

Computers
[Photo by Oneras]
A recent request by a researcher to help generate participants got me thinking about the rise of psychological research over the internet. The web can be tantalising for psychological researchers - access to millions upon millions of participants, reaching beyond the standard undergraduate pool to specialised groups, cheap online implementation and the resulting data already in electronic form. All these are acknowledged advantages but how many investigators are aware of some of the major pitfalls of online research? Birnbaum (2004) examines some of the problems researchers will face.

  • Multiple submissions - This is a commonly cited worry for online research, but, in practice, is not considered a problem by Birnbaum (2004). Examining large datasets, he has found little or no evidence of multiple submissions. Standard practices to avoid this include simply asking participants to avoid multiple submissions, scanning IP addresses or other identifiers for multiple instances and removing incentives.

  • Dropouts in Between-Subjects Research - High dropout rats can easily skew the results of between-subjects research. Perhaps this is partly because there's no social pressure to finish when people are sat on their own, as there is in a lab. One technique to combat this is providing a 'high-hurdle' to entry to get rid of the quitters early.

  • Sampling Bias and Stratified Analysis - Finding a representative sample is extremely important in many types of research and the sample reached online cannot be automatically considered representative. This can be countered by using a stratified analysis - looking at the results within, for example, age or education ranges. If these sub-samples reveal similar trends, the overall message of the data is easier to support.

  • Response Bias - It's even possible for researchers to be unaware of the different ways people are biased to respond to types of input devices, like check-boxes or drop-down menus. Each has its own characteristics which need to be taken into account.

Some researchers have looked at the differences found when lab results are compared with those obtained over the internet. There's quite a variation in their conclusions (Reips, 2001) - some have obtained the same results, some worse and some even claim that internet data is better (Birnbaum, 2004 reports Online Social Sciences as the source for this).

Overall, internet research can be useful, like any research method, as long as its advantages and disadvantages are understood.

Birnbaum (2004) Human Research and Data Collection via the Internet (Abstract)
Reips (2001) The Web Experimental Psychology Lab: Five years of data collection on the Internet (Abstract | PDF)

Participants Required for Study of Computer Use and Risk

Dr Monica Whitty writes looking for participants in online research she is conducting:
"The purpose of this study is to ascertain how individuals in different countries use their work computers and/or laptop computers. It also asks how they protect their work computers and/or laptops from security risks.

I'm looking for individuals [to complete the survey who are] 18 years or over and currently live and work (full time/part time or casually) in Australia, the Netherlands, Singapore, the UK, or USA [...] Only people who use a computer and/or laptop at work are invited to complete this survey (although you don't need to use one regularly)."

If you'd like to participate, and you are within her target group, then go here.

Unity's Enemy: Complacency

The greatest enemy of unity, or even just some kind of organisation in psychology, is complacency. Hayes (2004) argues that Henriques' attempt to (re)define psychology is essentially redundant as it won't result in any practical benefits. Hayes points to how his own house (behaviour analysis) is apparently in good theoretical order and has no need of these over-arching meta-theories. Further he wants to say that there is no way of knowing what benefits will accrue from developing a unified view of psychology - apparently coherence has no proven benefit.

Coherence has no proven benefit?

Since there is no way to conceive of the exact benefits of a theory we don't yet have, the only argument available is by analogy to theoretical unity in other disciplines. Does a unified theory of the fundamental forces of nature have any proven benefit? The physicists seem to think so. Has Darwin's theory been beneficial? Biologists seem to think so, along with others from many differen disciplines.

Surely only the most complacent of psychologists could deny the possible benefits of unification. Many are keeping their heads down and working within a paradigm that appears internally consistent. It's time to look up and see what everyone else is doing.

Hayes (2004) Taxonomy as a Contextualist Views It (Abstract)
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Unity: Psychology Defined

Unity 2
[Photo by rbs]
For me it's very difficult to understand what psychology is really about and what it consists of. Everyone seems to have different ideas which are often mutually exclusive. Not only that but psychologists seem to make little effort to bridge the enormous gaps that have been obvious for decades, or even centuries. Formally, psychology is a disaster zone.

The most fundamental distinction is between the mentalism of Freud and the anti-mentalism of Skinner. Is it important what goes on in your head or just what you do, your behaviour? Obviously both are important and any 'psychology' of humans has to incorporate both of these elements, but how is that done?

And then there's this jumble of sub-disciplines all with similar sounding names: biopsychology and psychobiology, cognitive neuroscience, behavioural neuroscience. How does it all fit together? How is it possible to make sense of it all?

Any effort towards unifying psychology, as discussed in this previous post, has to be carefully examined. Any kind of insight we can gain into how to solve this jigsaw puzzle of a discipline should be welcomed. It's possible a coherent picture will emerge.

Henriques (2004) puts forward the idea that psychology should be split into two separate areas. First is the field of psychological formalism. This includes the cognitive sciences such as cognitive neuroscience, animal cognition and cognitive ethology, and neurosciences like psychobiology and behavioural neuroscience.

Second is human psychology which is effectively a sub-discipline of psychological formalism. Human psychology should properly be defined as a hybrid between psychological formalism and the social sciences.

The problem for Henriques' idea is that it reminds us that we are animals, clever animals yes, but still animals. People don't want to be reminded of that, and, in fact, are reluctant to even accept it. For many people humans represent a separate class of being, rather than occupying the extreme end of a continuum of abilities like intelligence. Nevertheless, for this approach to work, acceptance of ourselves as animals is vital to unity in psychology.

Henriques (2004) Psychology Defined [Abstract | Full article PDF]
How Gregg Henriques explains his paper's high citation levels
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The Optician

Glasses
[Photo by Ondra L]
Nowadays efficient people-smart multi-national corporations are on the rise while local businesses go to the wall. If these smaller concerns misunderstand the psychology of the marketplace as fundamentally as my local optician then it's no mystery. Here's what happened...

Walking down my street I see that all the cars in my area are plastered with flyers on their windscreen from a local optician offering a 'free eye check-up'. Taking a closer look at one of these, I see that I can also obtain 60% off designer frames. Sounds like a tempting offer, right? Here is a local business using a cheap and straightforward methods to promote itself to new customers.

Wrong. This optician is not only making a fundamental mistake about human psychology but he is also denying his own shortcomings. I didn't draw both of these conclusions, though, from the flyers, I also had one other vital piece of information.

A few weeks ago I happened to go into this optician after being referred there by a pharmacist. The optician is on a fairly ordinary high street in a good area of London. It is one of those old-fashioned places which has wonky chairs in the waiting room and a receptionist who is happy to chat. Its customers are mostly older folks who have probably been going there for years and years. So far, so ordinary.

The problem came when I met the optician. He is certainly efficient and competent at his job, no question about that. Unfortunately his manner is bordering on rude and made me feel uncomfortable. Things got worse though when I decided not to buy my new glasses from him. Suddenly we moved immediately from a cool professionalism to barely concealed hostility.

After the exam he then proceeded to treat his, obviously long-suffering, receptionist like an incompetent fool, which she wasn't, and thoroughly sour my whole experience. And as a result I will never go back, I will not recommend the optician to my friends and I will not be tempted by the 60% off deal.

So, here's the first mistake the optician made in offering eye tests for free. Research has shown that people don't attach as much value to something that they get for free as something for which they have to pay*. Perversely, by giving something away - especially something as valuable as the expertise of a professional optician - the object or service itself is immediately devalued. Wow, people think to themselves, this optician must be rubbish if people won't even pay £20 for a simple eye exam.

Secondly, the optician has poor social skills that he needs to improve - but he won't. For him it is easier to pretend that his dwindling customers are a marketing problem that can be solved by a leafleting campaign. This is an example of the self-serving bias - people naturally prefer to abdicate responsibility for their failures. While the self-serving bias may maintain this optician's ego, it does nothing for the success of his business.

*I can't track down the original research for this but I read it quite recently. If anyone can help then please put me out of my misery!

Unity: Gregg Henriques

While Sternberg & Grigorenko's (2001) view is extremely attractive and practical, it is nevertheless a bottom-up approach that assumes that fixing the research process will also seal higher level theoretical fissures. Henriques' (2003) contrasting, although not necessarily contradictory, view is that extra levels of explanation or insight are required to link together theoretical models from the top downwards. Henriques is not just aiming to unify psychology here, but also to unite the natural and social sciences. In his view, psychology provides just such a bridging point.

As part of his project, Henriques (2003) takes on the seemingly impossible task of reconciling Sigmund Freud with B. F. Skinner. How can this be done since Skinner famously rejected the study of mental states that was the basis of Freud's work? Broadly, Henriques (2003) uses E. O. Wilson's ideas about the unity of knowledge (consilience) to suggest a 'Tree of Knowledge' which locates the physical sciences like physics at the base and psychology above biology and below the social sciences.

Tree of Knowledge

The Tree of Knowledge (above) provides a way of integrating ideas from a number of different levels of complexity. Specifically, then, it sees Skinner's theories as at a lower level of complexity from Freud who was operating on a more socio-cultural level. The problem, however, while recognising different levels of analysis, is in being able to make connections between them. This, Henriques (2003) argues, can be achieved by identifying and understanding the junction points between each of the levels.

It is the work of Skinner and Freud that provides the junction points. Skinner connects upwards from biology in to psychology and Freud connects upwards from psychology into culture. The papers on Henriques' website describe the details of how this is achieved.

Henriques' work is far from just theoretical though, he is a practicing clinical psychologist and his calls for unity have provoked considerable comment in two special issues of the Journal of Clinical Psychology.


Conclusion

Henriques' ideas, along with those of Sternberg and Grigorenko have major implications for the practical application of psychology to real-world issues. All psychologists, whether academic or clinical, would benefit from reflecting on this discussion about unity in psychology. Instead of riding the round-a-bout of fashionable therapies or investigating and proposing ever more disconnected theories, it is worth considering how the interfaces between current knowledge can be strengthened.

Henriques (2003) The tree of knowledge system and the theoretical unification of psychology (Abstract | PDF)
Henriques' Tree of Knowledge System website
The Psychology Wiki's page on the ToK system
Tree of Knowledge discussion list
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Unifying Psychology

Unity
[Photo by otherthings]
Since psychology's split from philosophy around the turn of the last century, much talk has focussed on how the discipline should model itself on the natural sciences. Wilhelm Wundt, the godfather of experimental psychology thought psychology should look towards physics for its inspiration. Physics and psychology are, of course, very different disciplines, but, despite this, they do still have one common goal.

A long-held dream of physicists is the unification of the fundamental forces of nature into a grand unified theory. Much progress has been made in unifying the electromagnetic forces but the difficult one has always been gravity. Some progress has been made with ideas like String Theory but finding that elusive Higgs Boson is holding things up.

Psychology, meanwhile, languishes back in the Dark Ages compared to physics. At least physics has agreed on common terminology for its fundamental concepts. You don't find different physicists with different names for gravity. By contrast in psychology, as Staats (1999) points out, we have, for example: 'self-concept', 'self-image', self-perception', 'self-esteem', 'self-efficacy' and the plain old 'self'. What's the difference? Perhaps little, yet all these words are still used and this is just one of many ill-defined concepts.

Let's set aside the question of whether it is possible or even desirable to unify psychology and accept its utility for the purposes of discussion. What factors have lead to the current state of disunity and how might this problem be rectified? Two recent articles provide some answers, Sternberg & Grigorenko (2001) see a largely methodological and organisational problem solved by the adoption of new research habits, while Henriques (2003) sees an epistemological problem in search of a meta-theoretical solution.


Sternberg & Grigorenko (2001)

The first problem Sternberg & Grigorenko (2001) identify is psychologists' focus on single methodologies. The example they provide - well-known to undergraduates - is of the connection, or lack of connection, found between attitudes and behaviour. The standard way of investigating attitudes in the past has been to ask people to complete a questionnaire on their attitudes and then, later, observe their behaviour. Frequently little connection is found between what people say they believe and how they act - a finding cynics would consider unsurprising.

A good example of a challenge to this approach is the Implicit Attitudes Test (IAT) used in the study of prejudice. This is a computer-based test that measures participant's reaction times to the faces of Black and White people. Low and behold a number of prejudices are revealed when each face is assessed relative to other faces. By relying on reaction times, this test cleverly nullifies the ability of participants to cover up their prejudiced attitudes in order to conform to social expectations.

Sternberg & Grigorenko (2001) call this methodological pluralism 'converging operations' and offer some reasons why researchers don't adopt this approach more often:

  • Training: Psychologists are often not trained in multiple methodologies and tend to see retraining in alternative methodologies as too great an investment of time and effort.

  • Panaceas: Researchers see the particular methodology they use as providing all or most of the answers that they are looking for. In reality, no one methodology can do this.

  • Norms: Journals, fields of study, departments. They all have norms researchers follow, whether consciously or unconsciously.

The second major problem for Sternberg & Grigorenko (2001) is the way psychology is split into sub-disciplines. One clear example of this is the study of memory. Memory is generally studied by cognitive psychologists who have trained in cognitive psychology and work in a department most closely with other cognitive psychologists. But memory should be studied across fields: by cognitive neuroscience, biological psychology, social psychology, clinical psychology, behavioural genetics and so on. Integrating ideas from all these fields on the same phenomenon seems more likely to produce a more useful model.

Ultimately the reason that change has not occurred is that many people have vested interests in the way the system already operates. Apart from this many are not aware, or do not accept, that there is a problem to be addressed.

Sternberg & Grigorenko (2001) Unified Psychology [Abstract]
More on Henriques' approach to unity in this post.

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